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THE SUPREME COURT IN THE 1980s:
A COMMENTARY ON THE S.C.R.
STATISTICS©
By PETER H. RUSSELL*
Scholars interested in the Supreme Court of Canada will be
pleased to see that the Osgoode Hall Law Journal has revived its practice
of publishing annual data on the work of the Court, as reported in the
Supreme Court Reports. While quantitative information of this kind is no
substitute for jurisprudential analysis, it does provide a general picture
of how the Court and its justices expend their jurisprudential energies.
Such quantitative data can also generate hypotheses about the impact
the Court is having on the legal system and about the orientation of its
judges.
The editors asked me to comment on the annual tables they have
produced for the decade from 1981 to 1990. I agreed to do so on the
condition that they produce some overall tables summarizing the
different categories of data for the entire ten years. This they have done
and the comments that follow are based on these summary tables. I
have commented only on broad trends that can be gleaned from the
tables without doing tests of statistical significance. Other scholars,
better equipped for quantitative analysis, will, I hope, draw on these
tables and the data bank from which they are derived for more
sophisticated and detailed analyses.
I. VOLUME, NATURE, AND SOURCE OF CASE LOAD
The data in Table 1 on the Court's overall volume of work show
how, after a sharp sag in the middle of the decade, the Court was able to
© Copyright, 1992, Peter H. Russell.
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recover and even exceed its earlier decision-making capacity. The mid-
1980s decline in decisions on the merits (the S.C.R. data does include
the Court's leave-granting work), as my colleagues Morton and Withey
and I argued in a recent contribution to this Journal 1 reflected
temporary problems resulting from the poor health of several justices




Years # of Private Affirmed/ Public Affirmed # Reported
Cases Reversed (%) Reversed (%) Motions
1981 105 35 46 73 66 3
1982 116 32 63 89 66 6
1983 87 25 77 64 44 1
1984 63 13 38 53 58 2
1985 84 16 60 73 58 0
1986 75 19 65 59 62 0
1987 93 18 35 76 68 1
1988 104 19 33 86 65 2
1989 127 27 37 105 62 7
1990 134 29 57 110 66 5
TOTAL 988 233 52 788 62 28
The rise in the Court's output towards the end of the decade can
be attributed mainly to the Charter. This becomes clear from a perusal
of Table 2 showing the subject matter of litigation before the Court. The
most dramatic increase is recorded in the Charter row, especially during
the last four years. The volume of criminal cases is up too-again
particularly over the last four years.
1 F.L. Morton, P.H. Russell & M.J. Withey, "The Supreme Court's First One Hundred
Charter of Rights Decisions: A Statistical Analysis" (1992) 30 Osgoode Hall LJ. 1 at 6-7.
2 Part I of the Constitution Acq 1982 being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.
[VOL 30 No. 4
1992] Commentary on the S.C.R. Statistics 773
TABLE 2
Subject Matter of Litigation
Subjects 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
References 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 1
Admin & Succ'n 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Commercial 14 18 11 4 11 7 9 5 13 12
Family Law 2 6 4 3 3 4 5 3 2 3
Intellectual Prop 1 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 2
Land 3 2 1 3 2 3 2 2 0 1
Torts 5 2 6 3 4 3 1 2 3 4
Other Private 7 3 4 1 2 5 1 5 11 6
Civil Law 13 8 6 3 3 0 3 4 11 9
Administrative 7 8 6 6 5 1 6 2 4 4
Charter 3 12 9 26 24 35 53
Constitutional 12 12 11 9 6 6 6 13 13 16
Criminal 32 35 29 23 29 21 36 46 41 52
Labour 8 10 7 6 5 3 4 3 3 4
Other Public 15 26 31 19 24 17 15 22 25 15
Procedural 22 38 32 18 34 24 31 30 51 48
Aff'd Crim/ 22 24 13 16 18 12 23 32 29 39
Total Crim 32 35 29 23 29 21 36 46 41 52
Aff'd Others/ 57 80 62 39 57 52 64 67 93 118
Total Others 109 135 120 79 111 83 110 115 173 178
Total of Criminal Cases:
Affirmed = 226 Total Criminal Cases = 344 Ratio = .657
Total of All Other Cases:
Affirmed = 684 Total of Other Cases = 1,213 Ratio = .564
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Much of the increase in the criminal case load has undoubtedly
been generated by the Charter. (It should be noted that cases that raise
both constitutional and criminal law issues are counted twice-indeed
even thrice if they also raise a division of powers issue2) The relatively
stable case-load levels in the other categories show that the Court has
dealt with its new Charter work not by reducing its work in other areas
but by increasing its overall output.
The Charter has increased the Supreme Court's public law
emphasis. However, while private law cases as a proportion of the
Court's overall case load fell during the decade from roughly 30 per cent
to 20 per cent, Tables 1 and 2 show that there has been no marked
decline in the aggregate number of cases dealt with in the main private
law categories. The slightly higher ratio of public law cases in which the
Court affirmed lower court decisions suggests that, in considering leave
applications, the Court may apply a tougher standard of scrutiny in
private law cases than in public law cases, and grant leave only where
there are strong grounds for questioning the decision below. Another
factor at work may be the continuation of a right to appeal in certain
criminal cases. The calculation shown at the bottom of Table 2 indicates
that the affirmed ratio is particularly high in criminal cases.
The point that jumps out from Table 3, which demonstrates the
source of Supreme Court appeals, is the variance in the frequency of
Supreme Court concurrence with the various, intermediate courts of
appeal. The Supreme Court appears more likely to uphold judgments of
Ontario, British Columbia, and Alberta courts of appeal than judgments
of other courts whose decisions are frequently reviewed. On the other
hand, the Federal Court of Appeal has experienced by far the highest
frequency of reversals. Indeed its reversal rate of nearly two-thirds
approximately matches the affirmation rate from the three largest
common law provinces. These disparities raise interesting speculations
on the jurisprudential kinships and differences, which have developed
among these courts.
3 A criminal case tlat raised Charter issues, division of powers issues, and non-constitutional
criminal law issues would be listed under "Charter," "Constitutional," and "Criminal".
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TABLE 3
Total Appellate Decisions From Source
(Number of Cases / # Affirmed - # Reversed)
AfFd/
Jurisdiction 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 Tot. Tot. (%)
Alberta 9 10 8 8 10 6 7 7 15 13 93 67.7
8-1 6-5 3-5 7-1 4-6 4-1 4-2 6-2 12-4 8-5 63
BC 7 12 8 9 9 11 11 18 22 21 130 70.0
5-2 6-6 4-5 9-1 7-3 10-3 6-2 14-4 14-13 16-5 91
Manitoba 10 4 7 1 6 5 9 7 12 15 76 46.1
3-5 2-2 3-4 1-0 3-3 3-2 5-4 4-3 5-7 6-8 35
N.B. 2 5 4 1 0 3 3 7 1 2 28 46.4
2-1 2-2 1-3 1-0 0-0 2-1 1-2 2-4 0-1 2-0 13
Nfld & Lab 2 3 0 1 1 0 1 3 5 1 17 58.8
0-1 2-1 0-0 0-1 0-1 0-0 1-0 3-0 3-3 1-0 10
NWT 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 100.0
0-0 0-0 0-0 0-0 1-0 0-0 0-0 0-0 0-0 1-0 2
Nova Scotia 3 4 5 0 4 4 5 0 6 3 34 50.0
1-2 3-1 5-3 0-0 1-3 1-3 3-1 0-0 4-2 0-3 17
Ontario 29 26 19 19 23 17 22 26 18 38 237 70.5
15-14 18-9 13-7 12-9 19-5 10-7 20-2 19-8 13-4 28-9 167
P.E.I. 0 2 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 5 60.0
0-0 2-0 0-0 0-0 0-0 0-1 0-0 1-0 0-0 0-0 3
Quebec 29 24 17 13 17 14 17 25 26 22 204 55.4
19-10 20-6 15-5 2-10 9-7 9-5 3-9 10-15 10-15 16-7 113
Sask. 4 5 3 2 3 2 5 5 8 8 45 55.6
3-1 2-3 1-2 1-1 2-1 0-2 4-1 3-2 4-3 5-3 25
Y.T. 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 1 5 80.0
0-0 1-0 0-0 0-0 0-0 1-0 2-0 0-0 0-0 0-1 4
Court Martial 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 100.0
A.C. 0-0 0-0 0-0 0-0 0-0 0-0 0-0 0-0 1-0 0-0 1
Federal Board 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0-0 0-0 0-0 0-0 0-0 0-0 0-0 0-0 0-0 0-0 0
Federal Court 12 20 16 8 8 11 10 5 13 10 173 36.4
7-6 13-6 7-11 2-7 4-5 8
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Table 4, Majority/Dissent ratios, shows a slightly declining rate of
agreement within the Court. The frequency of unanimous decisions has
fallen from a high of 87 per cent at the beginning of the decade to a low
of 68 per cent in 1990. Again the Charter is probably the main
explanation for this trend. From Table 13 below, showing
majority/dissent ratios in Charter cases, we can see that overall, the
frequency of unanimous decisions in Charter cases has only been 60 per
cent, and, since the initial "honeymoon period" of 1985-86, it has been
only 57 per cent. Still, the Canadian Supreme Court has a long way to
go before it reaches the degree of dissension within the United States
Supreme Court where the unanimity rate has been barely 20 per cent.4
The even greater prominence of the constitutional rights issue on that
court's docket is a key to its high frequency of split decisions.
TABLE 4
Majority/Dissent Ratios
Decisions 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 Total
Unanimous 95 103 72 57 74 62 77 85 101 97 824
Split 14 19 15 8 10 14 17 21 37 45 200
% Frequency
of Unanimous 87.2 84.4 82.8 87.7 88.1 81.6 81.9 80.2 73.2 68.3 80.5
Full Panels (9 & 8 Justices)
9:0 18 24 3 1 6 3 2 0 8 10
8:1 2 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1
7:2 3 3 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 1
6:3 2 3 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 2
5:4 0 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 3
8:0 1 0 0 4 2 0 5 1 0 1
7:1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
6:2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
5:3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0
4:4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Subtotal 27 32 5 6 12 7 9 4 11 18 131
% Frequency 24.5 26.2 5.7 9.2 14.3 9.2 9.6 3.8 8.0 12.7 12.8
4 H.J. Abraham, The Judicial Process: an Introductory Analysis of the Courts of the United
States, England and France, 4th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980) at 214.
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Decisions 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 Total
Medium Panels (7 & 6 Justices)
7:0 33 41 32 21 47 38 23 21 30 57
6:1 0 2 2 1 2 4 3 0 4 8
5:2 1 3 4 0 1 1 4 3 5 9
4:3 2 1 4 1 2 4 0 5 5 12
6:0 0 0 0 5 12 0 17 18 12 2
5:1 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 2 4 0
4:2 0 0 0 3 0 0 2 1 4 4
3:3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Subtotal 36 47 42 31 64 47 54 50 64 92 527
% Frequency 33.0 38.5 48.3 47.7 76.2 61.8 57.4 47.2 46.4 64.8 51.5
Small Panels (5 & 4 Justices)
5:0 42 35 38 23 6 20 24 39 40 25
4:1 2 1 3 0 0 0 1 3 2 0
3:2 1 4 0 2 1 1 0 3 6 5
4:0 0 0 0 3 1 1 6 6 6 0
3:1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
2:2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Subtotal 45 40 41 28 8 22 31 52 55 30 351
% Frequency 40.9 32.8 47.1 43.1 9.5 28.9 33.0 49.1 39.9 21.1 34.3
3:0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
2:1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1:0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0
Full Panels (9-8) Unanimous Decisions = 89 Split Decisions = 42
% Frequency of Unanimous Decisions = 67.9
Medium Panels (7-6) Unanimous Decisions = 409 Split Decisions = 118
% Frequency of Unanimous Decisions = 77.6
Small Panels (5-4) Unanimous Decisions = 315 Split Decisions = 37
% Frequency of Unanimous Decisions = 89.5
Table 4 shows that decision making by the full bench of nine
justices is still relatively rare. Most of the cases are heard by panels of
five, six, or seven justices. It is difficult to understand the justification
for this policy. Can it really be true that only 13 per cent of the cases
1992]
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decided by the Court during this decade were important enough to
warrant a full bench? Surely not. Most of the Court's docket is
discretionary and the criterion for granting leave is the public
importance of the issues in a case. Many of the most important Charter
cases were decided by less than the full court. Indeed, as Table 13, on
majority/dissent ratios in Charter cases shows, participation in these
cases has been basically the same as the overall pattern.
It is difficult to understand why the Supreme Court of Canada
persists in its policy of rarely having the full court participate in
decisions. The pressure of the Court's workload is not a very convincing
argument. Even though the Court is hearing more cases, it is not being
deluged by a swelling volume of leave applications, nor is it granting
leave more liberally. Statistics recently released by the Court indicate
that leave applications averaged 442 per year for the three years from
1988 to 1990.5 This is a little below the volume of leave applications at
the beginning of the decade.6 Also, the percentage of cases in which
leave was granted in the last three years of the decade averaged just 19
per cent-several points lower than in the early 1980s. Moreover,
although the Supreme Court has been hearing more cases, the time
limits introduced on oral argument should mean that it is hearing them
considerably faster.
The United States Supreme Court continues to sit as a full court
for all of its cases, even though it must screen (consider applications for
certiorari) about ten times more cases than the Supreme Court of
Canada, and it still manages to decide more cases on the merits each
year than the Canadian Court. It is difficult to believe that the quality of
its work, compared with that of the Canadian Supreme Court, suffers
from this greater workload. One can only surmise that the Chief Justice
and his colleagues think it does not matter very much whether the full
court sits for important cases. If that is the judiciary's thinking, it should
be questioned. As I have argued elsewhere, there are at least two
reasons why the full court should decide important cases. The first is the
need for collegiality in developing the country's jurisprudence: "[T]he
decisions of a national court of appeal which are essentially legislative in
character should emerge from an exchange of ideas among all of the
5 Supreme Court of Canada Bulletin: Special Edition, 5 May 1993.
6 See P.H. Russell, The Judiciary in Canada: The Third Branch of Government (Toronto:
McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1987) Table 14.2 at 346.
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Court's members representing all points of view and all parts of
Canada." 7 The second is the danger of the perception of bias in striking
panels if justices with well known ideological profiles are included or
excluded. Perhaps this latter point is not so telling at the present time
since, with the Laskins, Wilsons, and McIntyres gone, the Court's
personnel is relatively bland and unpredictable on the big public law
issues.
Table 5, the final table on the Court's overall work, shows the
activity of the justices in writing judgments. An interesting point that
emerges from this table is the large discrepancies in the amount of




Justices 1981 1982 19831984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 Total % Judg.
Beetz 4 9 7 3 7 9 13 12 9 73
57 77 48 36 50 44 39 47 11 409 15.1
Chouinard 12 15 9 7 8 9 0 60
16 77 56 42 52 45 0 288 17.2
Cory 11 28 39
50 71 121 24.4
Dickson 15 19 23 18 20 11 19 24 19 21 189
80 79 46 28 42 35 39 34 53 62 498 27.4
Estey 10 24 11 13 11 9 7 10 95
82 74 54 37 35 23 30 8 343 21.7
Gonthier 9 9 18
43 99 142 11.3
7 1bid. at 350.
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Justices 1981 198219831984 1985 19861987 1988 1989 1990 Total %Judg.
La Forest 6 13 18 16 24 28 105
13 28 47 56 80 80 304 25.7
Lamer 15 13 14 10 10 15 22 27 35 38 199
63 71 38 31 48 40 44 55 72 60 522 27.6
Laskin 40 33 17
34 45 21
Le Dain 1 8 7 14 9
6 34 44 49 32
L'Heureux-Dubd 1 12 21 25 59
18 46 81 92 237
Martland 17 15
58 30
McIntyre 10 13 12 9 15 11 24 19 14
83 84 61 43 48 39 46 55 25
McLachlin 13 29 42
9 66 75
Ritchie 8 16 9 6




3 27 47 77
5 49 72 126
0 0
5 5
5 10 10 15 19 25 20 35 37 176
21 44 35 44 36 44 58 70 66 418
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The figures in the column on the far right show the frequency
with which justices wrote opinions in the cases in which they took part.
Thus, it gives a fair indication of relative activity regardless of the length
of time served. Clearly Chief Justice Laskin was in a class by himself;
writing a judgment in just under half of the cases in which he
participated. After Laskin, come Justices Sopinka and McLachlin at 38
per cent and 36 per cent respectively. They are followed by a group of
justices-Wilson, Lamer, Dickson, Martland, La Forest, and Cory-in
the 30 per cent to 25 per cent range. Call these the "work-horses," the
intellectual leaders, or the busybodies of the Court, the fact remains that
these nine justices had the most direct say in shaping the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence in the 1980s.
Turning now to the aggregate data on the Supreme Court's
decisions involving the Charter during the decade, I will have less to say
as the trends shown in these tables are consistent with the findings
reported in our earlier analysis of the Court's first one hundred Charter
cases. This is so despite the fact that the Journal's editors have followed
different rules in counting Charter cases. In one sense, they have been
more stringent than we were; they excluded cases concerning
constitutional rights outside the Charter whereas we included cases
dealing with Aboriginal rights, as well as minority education and
language rights in the Constitution Act, 1867. On the other hand, the
present study has been more liberal by counting as separate cases,
appeals from different jurisdictions raising the same issue that were all
decided by the same reasons, and by including cases that were not
decided on Charter grounds but in which the Charter was "considered."
Despite these differences in counting rules, the patterns
disclosed are very similar, beginning with the overall success of Charter
claimants shown in Table 6. The editors, as we did, have counted as a
"win" only those cases in which the Court found that a Charter right was
infringed and the disposition was sought by the claimant, that is, the
limit on the right was not found to be reasonable under section 1 and the
evidence was excluded under section 24(2). Here we see the Court's
"honeymoon period" with the Charter in the first two years, when it
upheld two-thirds of the claims in Charter cases, then the slide through
1986 downwards to the much lower success rate of 26 per cent to 30 per
cent that has prevailed since 1987. This lower rate is likely to be a long-
term trend.
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TABLE 6
Success Rates of Charter Claimants
Year # of Cases Winning % Losing % Other
1984 3 66.7 33.3 0
1985 12 66.7 25 8.3
1986 9 44.4 44.4 11.1
1987 26 26.9 65.4 7.7
1988 23 26.1 73.9 0
1989 36 27.8 63.9 8.3
1990 56 30.4 60.7 8.9
Table 7, on the object of litigation, shows that the target of the
Supreme Court's Charter review is more often the executive branch of
government than the legislature. I suspect that in the lower courts this
trend is even more marked as many routine Charter cases involving the
review of police activities do not reach the Supreme Court. Also, it is
interesting to observe that federal legislation is reviewed much more
frequently than provincial legislation. This differs from the situation in
the United States where now, state legislation is most often reviewed for
Bill of Rights infractions. However, our earlier study showed that, in
terms of significant policy reversals, the provinces have lost more than
the federal government through the Supreme Court's Charter review.8
8 F.L. Morton et aL, supra note 1 at 25-26.
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TABLE 7
Object of Charter Litigation
(Number of Cases / Per cent of Cases / Success Rate)
Legislation Administration Common
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Tables 8 and 8B, which indicate variations in the success of
Charter claimants and appellants from the various sources of Supreme
Court appeals, reveal an interesting similarity between Charter cases and
the Court's overall workload.
TABLE 8
Charter Litigation by Source
(Number of Cases / Per cent of Cases / # Claimant Wins-Loses-Other)
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TABLE 8B
Reversal Rate by Source
(# Affirmed - Reversed - Other)
Source 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 Total %
Alberta 1-0-0 1-1-2 2-0-0 1-0-1 5-2-0 4-4-0 14-7-3 29.2
B. C. 1-0-0 2-0-0 3-1-1 6-0-0 7-0-0 7-3-1 26-4-2 12.5
Manitoba 0-2-0 2-0-0 1-1-0 1-2-1 4-5-1 50
N.B. 1-1-0 1-1-0 50
Nfld. 0-1-0 1-0-0 1-1-0 50
N.S. 1-0-1 0-1-0 0-2-0 1-3-1 60
Ontario 0-1-0 2-0-1 3-0-0 8-0-0 8-1-0 4-1-0 20-6-0 45-9-1 16.4
P.E.I. 0-0-1 1-0-0 1-0-1 0
Quebec 1-0-0 0-0-2 1-3-0 2-6-0 1-1-0 5-10-2 58.8
Sask. 1-0-0 1-1-0 0-1-0 2-1-0 4-3-0 57.1
N.W.T. & Y. 1-0-0 1-1-0 2-1-0 33.3
Fed. Court 1-1-0 1-0-0 1-1-0 2-0-0 5-2-0 28.6
As in the overall picture, Charter cases from Ontario and British
Columbia courts of appeal are most often upheld by the Supreme Court.
However, the Federal Court of Appeal, which was most frequently
overruled in the aggregate, fares much better in Charter appeals in which
it has a relatively low rate of reversal. Whatever jurisprudential
differences exist between the Supreme and federal courts appear not to
be operative in the Charter field.
What clues do these data provide in terms of ideological
differences between the Supreme Court and the provincial appellate
courts on Charter issues? Figure 1 combines reversal rates of the various
sources with the success of Charter claimants from the various sources of
Charter appeals. There does not appear to be any marked correlation
between reversal rates and the direction of Charter outcomes. Look, for
[VOL 30 No. 4
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instance, at Nova Scotia, Quebec, and Saskatchewan, the provinces with
the three highest reversal rates.
FIGURE 1
Reversal Rate & % of Claimant Wins
- Reversal Rate by Source (%)
Alta B.C. Man. N.B. Nfld. N.S.
E- - % Claimant Wins
Ont. P.E.I. Que. Sask. NWT Fed.
& Y Ct.
The success of Charter claimants in appeals from these provinces
varies considerably: quite high for Quebec, moderate for Nova Scotia,
and low for Saskatchewan. Unlike our analysis of this aspect of the first
hundred Charter cases, the data shown here on claimant wins are for
wins in all appeals from each source, not just appeals in which the
Supreme Court reversed the lower court. However, our analysis showed
that, even when the focus is entirely on Charter wins in successful
appeals, no clear ideological direction can be discerned. 9 It may be that
the ideological factor at work in these Charter case is the Court's middle-
of-the-road position on the Charter. This results in higher reversal rates
of lower courts that are more markedly "conservative" on the Charter
(for example, the Nova Scotia and Quebec Courts of Appeal) or more
markedly "liberal" (like the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal). However,
9 Ibid. at 19.
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in order to confirm this possibility, more detailed analysis is needed.
TABLE 9
Subject of Charter Litigation
(# of Claimant Wins - # of Cases)
Year Fundamental Democratic Mobility Legal Rights Equality Other
Freedoms Rights Rights Section 7 (7 - 14) Rights Rights
1984 0-1 1-1 1-1
1985 2-2 2-5 6-10 0-2
1986 1-3 0-2 3-7 0-3
1987 0-4 3-9 10-32 0-1 0-4
1988 2-3 2-6 3-28 0-1 3-5
1989 1-6 1-2 0-7 7-26 2-5 2-7
1990 1-8 8-24 23-65 2-13 3-7
Total 7-26 1-3 15-53 53-169 4-20 9-29
% Wins 26.9 33.3 28.3 31.0 20.0 31.0
Anyone knowledgeable about Charter cases will not be surprised
by the data on the subject of Charter litigation as shown in Table 9.
Clearly, the overwhelming proportion of Supreme Court cases dealing
with the Charter, in purely quantitative terms, consider the legal rights
sections and section 7. But here is a point where a qualitative analysis
would give quite a different picture because arguably the decisions the
Court has rendered on other categories of rights, especially fundamental
freedoms and equality rights, have been at least as important as the great
mass of its decisions in legal rights cases. As for the success of Charter
claimants in the various categories of Charter cases, the one point that
stands out is the relative paucity of successes in cases raising equality
rights issues. This too will come as no great surprise to those who
expected a great deal more from section 15.
Several times in this commentary I have referred to the relatively
788 [VOL. 30 No. 4
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middle-of-the-road position, which has come to characterize the
Supreme Court's approach to the Charter. The consolidated tables on
the participation of justices in these first seven years of Charter cases
provide some evidence of this tendency.
TABLE 10
Action of the Judges
(# Judgments Written for the: Court - Majority - Dissent)
Justices 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 Total % Diss.
Beetz 0-0-0 0-1-0 0-3-0 1-2-0 0-3-0 0-1-1 1-10-1 8.3
Chouinard 0-0-0 0-0-0 0-0-0 0-0-0 0
Cory 1-1-0 3-9-6 4-10-6 30.0
Dickson 1-0-0 0-2-0 0-3-0 1-1-2 1-7-2 3-1-0 6-7-2 12-21-6 15.4
Estey 1-0-0 0-2-0 0-1-0 0-1-2 0-0-0 1-4-2 28.6
Gonthier 0-1-0 0-2-0 0-3-0 0
La Forest 1-1-0 0-3-0 0-9-0 2-3-1 1-5-2 0-13-3 4-34-6 13.6
Lamer 0-0-0 0-3-0 0-2-1 4-8-3 3-2-2 5-5-2 1-19-1 13-39-9 14.8
Le Dain 1-1-0 0-0-0 0-6-0 3-1-0 4-8-0 0
L'Heureux-Dub6 0-0-0 0-2-0 0-2-2 0-9-6 0-13-8 38.1
McIntyre 0-0-0 1-1-2 0-5-0 0-5-3 0-5-2 3-2-3 4-18-10 31.3
McLachlin 0-0-0 1-6-9 1-6-9 56.3
Ritchie 0-0-0 0-0-0 0
Sopinka 5-2-2 0-26-4 5-28-6 15.4
Wilson 0-0-0 0-4-0 0-4-2 1-9-4 0-5-1 2-4-4 0-7-11 3-33-22 37.9
1992]
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In Table 10, Action of the Judges, we can see that the bulk of the
Court's Charter jurisprudence has come from the pens of a small number
of judges. Three-quarters of the Court's Charter judgments have been
written by six of its members: Lamer (61), Wilson (58), La Forest (44),
Dickson (39), McIntyre (32), and Sopinka (29). Two of these six,
McIntyre and Wilson, wrote more than twice as often in dissent than the
other four. The reason for this is evident when we examine the data on
the direction of the justices' voting in.Charter cases shown in Table 11.
TABLE 11
Voting Behaviour of Justices
(Support for: Claimant - Government - Other)
% Support
Justices 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 Total For Claimant
Beetz 2-1-0 6-2-1 2-4-1 5-13-1 5-13-0 4-2-1
Chouinard 1-0-0 7-3-1 3-3-1
Cory 4-12-1 15-19-2
Dickson 2-1-0 8-3-1 4-3-0 9-14-1 5-16-0 8-16-3 13-31-2
Estey 2-1-0 4-3-2 3-3-0 5-8-0 1-3-0
Gonthier 3-10-1 15-30-2










2-1-0 8-3-1 4-3-0 9-10-5 9-11-0 10-21-3 15-26-2 57-75-11
4-3-0 3-4-0 7-11-2 1-7-0 15-24-25
UHeureux-Dub6 0-2-0 2-9-0 6-24-2 18-30-0 26-65-2
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Of the six largest producers of Charter jurisprudence, McIntyre
was the least pro-claimant and Wilson, the most pro-claimant. These
justices, who were ideologically at the opposite edges of the Court on
Charter issues, are gone, and have been replaced by justices with a less
discernible orientation.
Of the more recently appointed justices who have written a
substantial number of judgments in Charter cases, Madame Justice
McLachlin has been the marked dissenter with over half of her
judgments in dissent. But her general orientation regarding the Charter
as measured by her votes in Charter cases, is mostly in the middle of the
Court. Indeed, an interesting feature of the data on judgment writing is
that the three women members of the Court wrote frequently in dissent.
This indicates, perhaps, not so much a common ideological disposition
as a remarkable independence of mind.
The Journal's study has also garnered statistical data on the
different categories of litigants and their relative success in Charter cases.
The consolidation of these data as shown in Table 12 illustrates two
interesting points. The first is that business corporations, despite
participating relatively infrequently in Charter litigation at the Supreme
Court level, are clearly the most successful type of litigant. The second
point is that on the few occasions (only 5) when interveners have been
entirely on the claimant's side they have done extremely well-indeed,
they have never lost! Both points should be followed up by more
detailed studies. Empirical work on the use of Charter litigation by
interest groups and governments is under-developed in Canada. 10
10 For a pioneering work in this area, see I. Brodie, "Interest Groups in Court: Beyond the
Political Disadvantage Theory" (Paper presented at the 1992 Annual Meeting of the American
Political Science Association, 3-6 September 1992) [forthcoming in the American Political Science
Review].
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TABLE 12
Types of Charter Claimants and Interveners
(# of Cases / Per cent of Cases / # Claimant: Wins-Loses-Other)
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 Total
Business 1 2 1 1 3 5 5 18
Corporations 33 17 11 4 13 14 9
1-0-0 2-0-0 1-0-0 0-0-1 2-1-0 1-4-0 0-5-0 7-10-1
Individuals 1 8 6 22 20 31 52 140
33 67 67 85 83 86 93
0-1-0 5-2-1 3-2-1 7-14-2 5-15-0 8-19-3 15-32-5 43-85-12
Interest 1 1 1 1 4
Groups 8 11 4 2
0-1-0 0-1-0 0-1-0 1-0-0 1-3-0
Unions 1 1 3 1 2 8
8 11 12 4 4
0-1-0 0-1-0 0-3-0 0-1-0 1-1-0 1-7-0




Cases for Clmt 1 1 3 5
# Clmt Wins 1 1 3 5
Cases for Gov't 3 5 7 14 11 34 74
# Gov't Wins 1 3 5 3 8 25 45
Cases for Both 1 1 6 5 4 17
# Clmt Wins 1 1 2 4
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I have already commented on the data shown in Table 13 on the
majority/dissent ratio in Charter cases. Here we can see that all but a
handful of Charter cases during this formative period were decided by
panels of five or seven judges, and that, as the Court came to deal more
frequently with the Charter, it became much more divided.
TABLE 13
Majority/Dissent Ratio in Charter Cases
Decisions 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 Total
Unanimous 3
Split
10 6 15 16 23 26 99
0 2 3 11 7 13 30 66
% Freq. of
Unanimous 100 83.3 66.7 57.7 69.6 63.9 46.4
Full Panels (9 & 8 Justices)
1 1 5 4 11
1 4 1 4
33.3 33.3 11.1 15.4
1 5 7 22
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Decisions 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 Total





























Full Panels (9 & 8)
Medium Panels (7 & 6)
Small Panels (5 & 4)
Unanimous Decisions = 17 Split Decisions = 5
% Frequency of Unanimous Decisions = 77.3
Unanimous Decisions = 69 Split Decisions = 48
% Frequency of Unanimous Decisions = 59.0
Unanimous Decisions = 16 Split Decisions = 9
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Finally, Table 14 on the Court's treatment of the exclusion of
evidence under the Chartees section 24(2), provides one clue to the
divisiveness of Charter decision making. As we argued in our analysis of
the Court's first hundred Charter decisions, section 1 and section 24(2)
of the Charter are highly judgmental in nature, requiring determinations
that are not readily settled by established precedents.11
TABLE 14
Legal Rights and Section 24(2)
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 Total
Section
24(2) Used 3 1 5 5 8 10 32
Evidence
Excluded 3 1 3 1 4 6 18
Evidence
Admitted 2 4 3 4 13
Other 1 1
Thus, in Table 14 we see that over the last four years of the
decade, the results of section 24(2) arguments before the Court were
evenly divided between exclusion and admission of evidence. It would
be interesting to have data on the rate of dissent in these cases, as well as
on cases whose outcome turned on a section 1 ruling. But the problem
with judicial statistics is that a little is apt to wet one's appetite for more!
11 Supra note 1 at 36.
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